

ABSTRACTS

Nozick's View of Reductionism

Jeff Dycus

The intent of this paper is to criticize the view of reductionism that Nozick describes in Chapter 6 of *Philosophical Explanations*. This criticism is based on the fact that he gives an unfair description of the view and then on the basis of this description, attacks the view as being immoral. I then offer brief descriptions of reductionism that may seem more equitable to those working under the label "reductionist."

Did Jesus Rise From the Dead The Habermas-Flew Debate

Gilbert Fulmer

In 1987 there was published an account of a debate between Gary Habermas and Antony Flew on the Resurrection. Responses indicated that most observers believed Habermas won. Here I argue that Flew actually won on the merits, but his flawed strategy allowed Habermas to appear victorious.

First, Flew did not press his most powerful arguments effectively. And he allowed Habermas to set the terms of the debate much of the time, arguing, against his own best interests, points of factual detail about biblical reports. On Flew's premises this is unnecessary because his strongest point is that it is impossible to establish such facts.

Value-Free Science: A Critical Analysis

John Haddox

The negatively critical outlooks of several existentialists (including, briefly, Soren Kierkegaard, Miguel de Unamuno, José Ortega y Gasset, Nicholas Berdyaev, and, at greater length, Karl Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel) concerning the application of abstract, quantitative methodologies of sciences to ethical issues are examined.

Then the concept of "value-free" sciences (including social sciences) developed by Max Weber (here as interpreted by Peter Berger) is utilized in an attempt to alleviate the concerns raised by the existentialists considered earlier.

Quine's Ideas Of Class Complement, Unit And Null Classes Seem To Involve A Touch Of Dialectic

Ivan L. Little

Traditional logic posits what is not in class y in the complement, $\neg y$. Thus 'No x is y ' obverts to 'All x is $\neg y$.' Quine's revised *Mathematical Logic* does not allow the formula, $E, '(y) (x) x \neq y \equiv x = \neg y'$ to obvert. E is false because a class z is such that Λ (the null class) is a member of z , which can be proved to be neither Λ nor V (the universe class). The truth of E would require "for every choice of y , that the only entity other than y be $\neg y$," (Sect. 33). As Quine fails to populate a logical middle between Λ and V , z is no threat to E . But E becomes a contradiction when denied. Therefore, it seems to me that this dialectical attempt to reduce the logical being of y to nothing is actually a failure.

But Quine's unit class, iy , "having itself as sole member," ap-

pears to repeat Hegel's first dialectical movement: Being. Nothing, Becoming. The class iy becomes Λ , but when natural numbers are introduced, iy becomes 1, the unit class of all unit classes. Now as $iy = 1$, its negation, $-iy$, has the value of minus 1. When this negation enters into a logical statement which I shall simplify, the logical product, $n + 1 \cap -iy$, equals n . In this manner, new numbers of an infinite series can emerge, i.e., be deduced; the possibility of their coming to be is insured.

The dialectic whole must contain its self-negation. As $\Lambda = -V$, and as Λ is a member of V , it follows that $-V$ is a member of V . This logical negation of V is accepted, as Λ is null.

Plato, Guardian Mothers, And The Reproduction Of The Ideal State

Audrey McKinney

When Plato articulates his vision of the ideal society in the *Republic*, he attends not only to the conditions necessary for his utopic city to be realized but also to the conditions necessary for the city to reproduce itself and endure over time. I argue that Plato's concern with the reproduction of the ideal state crucially shapes his placement of women within the guardian class. Plato's call for the repudiation of private property on the part of male guardians *together with* his eugenic policies, especially his commitment to selective breeding, leads him to the proposal, radical in its time, that women be among those who will protect the city: the women mated to guardian males must themselves be guardians if they are to fulfill their reproductive task and insure the future well-being of the city by producing the very best future guardians.

Causal Laws, Natural Laws, And Lewis' Theory Of Counterfactuals

James Norris

In works preceding his *Counterfactuals*, David Lewis has sketched out how causal implication is to be treated as a species of counterfactual implication. In *Counterfactuals*, Lewis develops a formal theory of logic for the rendering and evaluation of counterfactual conditionals. He also addresses laws of nature, which appear to involve causal, and therefore, counterfactual implication. Unfortunately, he makes the outrageous claim that a possible world, very similar to the actual world in all its particular matter-of-fact, but only if a "small miracle" occurs (i.e. a "localized violation" of natural law), might be considered closer than any other possible world, even one where all the natural laws are the same, but the matters-of-fact differ somewhat more from the actual world than the 'miraculous world.' Lewis then claims that inclusion of this miracle in the statement of the violated law may leave it "simple and strong enough to survive as a law." This flies in the face of what appear to be the necessary conditions for a statement to be regarded as a natural law. What these necessary conditions are, why Lewis' claim flouts these conditions, and Lewis' possible motivation for making this claim is also discussed. On the basis of this, it is claimed that the assignment of this kind of 'miraculous world' as the closest possible world should be disallowed. If it is, Lewis' formal system is in no way harmed, and is, in fact, left capable of rendering and evaluating natural laws.

Husserl, Heidegger, And Phenomenology

Richard Owsley

Martin Heidegger, the man and the philosopher, is controversial. Both his detractors and his defenders have made *ad hominum* arguments, current if not defensible. Much of the general appraisal of the Heideggerian project centers on his practical and theoretical relation to Edmund Husserl. Accounts concerning this relation vary. There are those who castigate Heidegger as discourteous, disloyal, and disrespectful of the older man. As rector of the University of Freiburg, Heidegger may have oppressed Husserl because he was Jewish, because he was old, or because he disagreed with Heidegger. More important than the personal relationship between Heidegger and Husserl is a comparison between their respective philosophical positions. This may clarify issues so that moral judgments if necessary may be more firmly based. Both thinkers have the same motto: "back to things themselves." Both advocate the same method (phenomenology). They even seem to have the same enemies, naturalists. It is the contention of this paper that things, phenomena, and nature are methodologically different for the two thinkers in question. It is further contended that highlighting the contrasts between the starting point, the method of procedure and the conclusions of Husserl and Heidegger can be the beginning of a forthright and accurate appraisal of Heidegger the man and Heidegger the thinker.

Author, Text, And Judgment: Toward A Position On The Heidegger Controversy

Wayne Owens

The so-called Heidegger controversy – the relationship, if any, between Heidegger's Nazi affiliations and his philosophy – has sparked a heated debate about the relationship between the belief a philosopher harbors but about which she has had little to say and the philosophy she puts forth for public scrutiny. The goal of this paper is to prepare the groundwork for formulating a position on the Heidegger controversy by reviewing and evaluating some of the more common reasons for rejecting any philosophical text as unacceptable and, to a lesser extent, judging it favorably. No position specifically on the Heidegger controversy is presented although one is suggested.

The following are the reasons considered: refusing to even read a text simply because of something known and disliked about its author; rejecting a text, once read, simply because it is not understood, because of something known about the author as a person, because of views she has which are irrelevant to the text in question, because of the perceived origin of the expressed views, and because of the suspicion the author is not being serious; rejecting a whole text (or philosophy) because of an objection to a part of it; rejecting (or accepting) a text because it does not jibe (or does jibe) with the views of the reader; rejecting a text because it contains internal inconsistencies or because it seems to suggest undesirable consequences.

The conclusion drawn is that everything extrinsic to the text and its implications and all beliefs and views and opinions brought to the text which are irrelevant to the subject matter of the text are out of order when it comes to judging its acceptability or unacceptability. Put differently, if a text does not conflict with the reader's own well-

thought-out views, contains no internal inconsistencies, and does not legitimately suggest or point to untoward consequences, then the reader is rationally obliged to accept the text, at least tentatively.

Primitive Society And The Failure Of Marxism

Stephen F. Schlett

Historically Marxism is rooted in notions about primitive societies, including the relationship between production and consumption and the significance of use value versus exchange value. Also central is the notion of primitive man's ability to pre-conceive situations. These are the fundamental tenets upon which Marxism rests. This paper shows how each of these is either wrong or misguided because Marx as well as Lukacs based humanness upon the notion of production. Once these basic tenets fail so does the Marxist system. Marx, Lukacs and other Marxists occasionally offer insight into complex social phenomena, and their system has acted as a buffer against a sometimes brutal capitalism. However, Marxism is, as a social philosophy, in decline because of the misperceptions about essential human nature. This paper attempts to lay out the decline in Marxism as related to its misguided views of human nature. Additionally, it laments this passage of Marxism as it currently leaves capitalism unchallenged.

Can Artifacts Have Interests?

Robert Skipper

In traditional moral theory, artifacts have no moral status. Yet artisans are often urged to sacrifice something for the sake of their work. This paper is an attempt to make some sort of sense out of such notions. Can an artifact even have a sake for which someone can act? Could artifacts have interests which artisans can further or hinder?

After showing the inadequacy of other approaches, I suggest that we think of artifacts as integrated and complete bundles of solutions to problems of practical cognition. We may then critique artifacts on their successes as solution sets, rather than merely on their properties. By a criticism, I have in mind not the statement of subjective preferences, but the pointing out of a better solution. Artifacts, then, may be objectively criticizable, and in this sense vulnerable. Now the possibility of criticism implies the possibility of blame, but artifacts are not persons and so cannot be blamed. Blame, therefore, if it exists, must rest with the artisan. The possibility of blame entails the possibility of an obligation, so the artisan may have an obligation to make artifacts that are as free from criticism as possible. Acting so as to fulfill such an obligation would be an important sense in which the artisan could act for the sake of an artifact.

If-Then: A Conditional Statement Unless It Is a Biconditional

Troy D. Williamson

In deductive logic, students are generally told that “unless” indicates an inclusive disjunction. Yet several authors suggest that this term, like other disjunction indicators, has an exclusive sense. Unfortunately, these authors seldom explain how to determine when the exclusive sense is used.

I suggest that disjunction indicators should be translated in the exclusive sense whenever it is impossible for both of the disjuncts to be true simultaneously. Doing so seems to correctly capture the intent of the speaker.

The major objection to this is that it introduces modality; that is, to consider whether the disjuncts can be simultaneously true involves a question of possibility, which is outside of sentential logic. However, there are instances in which the exclusion is necessary in order for the argument to yield all of the conclusions (validly) inferred from the premises.

In order to avoid the problem of modality, the acceptance of an implied exclusion can be seen instead as the mere addition of a suppressed premise. That is, such arguments can be viewed as enthymemes, acknowledging the fact that much of everyday discourse is enthymematic in nature. Construing the argument as an enthymeme, we translate the disjunction exclusively, even though the exclusion was not explicitly stated.

There are other ramifications of this approach. For example, statements which are expressed as conditionals might actually need to be translated as biconditionals. But instead of being a problem for the logician, this seems to simply reflect the inherent complexity involved in translating English sentences into logical notation.

CONTRIBUTORS

Joe Barnhart is professor of philosophy at the University of North Texas and the author and co-author of nine books. Currently he is completing a large historical novel on Roger Williams.

Gary Cesarz received his Ph.D. in philosophy in 1988, focusing mainly in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, and the history of philosophy and science. These interests are reflected in articles on the thought of Aristotle, Kant, German and British idealism, Russell and Husserl. He teaches part-time for the University of New Mexico and Chapman University (branch program), but mainly earns his keep developing curriculum, test materials, and specialized training programs for the New Mexico State Department of Corrections.

Allen Coates earned his B.A. at the University of New Mexico and is currently doing graduate work there. He has been awarded a teaching assistantship for the past three years.

Houghton Dalrymple has had articles appear in *Southwest Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophical Topics* and *Contemporary Philosophy*, and has published two texts on introductory logic. His areas of specialization are British empiricism, philosophy of mind, and action theory. He has taught at McMurry University, the University of North Texas and the University of Texas at Arlington. He now resides in Arlington, Texas.

Kevin Dodson is assistant professor of philosophy at Lamar University. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and his B.A. in philosophy from the University of Washington. He specializes in ethics, social/political philosophy, and the history of modern philosophy. He is the author of

numerous publications and his book *Ways Of Knowing: Selected Readings* was recently published by Kendall/Hunt.

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Richard Owsley is professor and former Chair of Philosophy at the University of North Texas. He previously taught in the Departments of Philosophy at Indiana University and Auburn University.

Wayne D. Owens is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Incarnate Word College. His primary interests are Contemporary Continental Philosophy and Asian Philosophy.

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Robert Skipper teaches philosophy at Southwest Texas State University. His general areas of current interest are ethics and metaethics, and specifically the problems of language, logic, and measurement. His articles have appeared in *Ethics*, *Journal of Business Ethics*, *Business Ethics: A European Review*, *Business Horizons*, and *Jour-*

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Lee Stauffer holds the position of Assistant Professor of Philosophy at New Mexico Highlands University. She received her doctorate in philosophy from the University of New Mexico with specialization in comparative philosophy and the philosophy of science. In addition to publishing in philosophy, she has published nationally in the fields of linguistics, archaeology and computer science.

Arthur Stewart is the director of the Center for Philosophical Studies at Lamar University, Beaumont, Texas. His *Elements of Knowledge: Pragmatism and Philosophy of Knowledge* (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing) appeared last year. He received his Ph.D. from Texas Tech University in 1987.

Jack Weir has taught at Hardin-Simmons University and McMurry University. He currently teaches at Morehead State University and is especially concerned with environmental issues and animal rights.

Troy Williamson is a graduate student at Texas Tech University. He completed his B.A. degree in philosophy at Texas Tech in May of 1992 and his M.A. degree in August of 1993. He has served as an instructor in the Philosophy Department of Texas Tech and has also taught philosophy as a part-time instructor at Lubbock Christian University.

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Correction: In the 1994 *Journal*, 1993 Proceedings on page 106, the author's name should be listed as Troy Dale Williamson.

The New Mexico and West Texas Philosophical Society 1994 Program

Host Institution – University of Texas at El Paso
Conference Sessions at the Cliff Inn Hotel
1600 Cliff Drive, El Paso, Texas 79902

FRIDAY, APRIL 15

Cliffhanger Room

7:30-10:00 Registration and Social Hour

SATURDAY, APRIL 16

First Session

8:30-10:15 a.m.

Cliffhanger Room C

John Haddox (UTEP), Chair

8:30-9:05

Allen Coates (UNM)

Plato's "Worst Difficulty" Argument In The
Parmenides

9:05-9:40

Audrey McKinney (SWT)

Plato, Guardian Mothers, And The Reproduction Of
The Ideal State

9:40-10:15

Joe Barnhart (UNT)

Thomas Hobbes On Union Of Church And State

Cliffhanger Room D

Lee Stauffer (NMHU), Chair

8:30-9:05

Gilbert Fulmer (SWT)

Did Jesus Rise From The Dead? The Habermas/
Flew Debate

- 9:05-9:40 **William Springer (UTEP)**
Ignorance, Superstition, Fear And Loathing
- 9:40-10:15 **C. Lynne Fulmer (SWT)**
And Justice For All: Is Justice Masculine?

Second Session
10:30 a.m.-12:15 p.m.

Cliffhanger Room C

Joseph Stamey (McMurry U), Chair

- 10:30-11:05 **Lee Stauffer (NMHU)**
Monads, Cellular Automata, And Neural Nets
- 11:05-11:40 **James Norris (KSU)**
Causal Laws, Natural Laws, And Lewis' Theory
- 11:40-12:15 **Houghton Dalrymple (UT Arlington)**
Reid's Critique Of The Theory Of Ideas

Cliffhanger Room D

Jack Weir (Morehead State U), Chair

- 10:30-11:05 **Peter Hutcheson (SWT)**
Testing Paradigms
- 11:05-11:40 **Richard Owsley (NTU)**
Husserl, Heidegger, And Phenomenology
- 11:40-12:15 **Wayne Owens (Incarnate Word College)**
Author, Text, And Judgment: Toward A Position On
The Heidegger Controversy

Third Session
1:30-3:15 p.m.

Cliffhanger Room C

Arthur Stewart (Lamar U), Chair

- 1:30-2:05 **Kevin Dodson (Lamar U)**

Democracy And Respect: A Kantian Approach To
Multiculturalism

- 2:05-2:40 **Gary Cesarz (UNM)**
Implication And McTaggart's Theory Of Relations
- 2:40-3:15 **Stephen Schlett (El Paso)**
Primitive Society And The Failure Of Marxism

Cliffhanger Room D

Charles Harriman (CSF), Chair

- 1:30-2:05 **Ivan Little (TTU)**
A Short Note On Quine's Concept Of Class
Complement: A Puzzle Or Two And A Touch Of
Dialectic
- 2:05-2:40 **Troy Williamson (TTU)**
If-Then: A Conditional Statement *Unless* It Is a
Biconditional
- 2:40-3:15 **Jack Weir (Morehead State U)**
Propositional Attitudes And Scientific Realism:
Quine, Fine, And Rorty

Fourth Session
3:30-4:40 p.m.

Cliffhanger Room C

Richard Owsley (UNT), Chair

- 3:30-4:05 **Charles Harriman (College of Santa Fe)**
Objectivity
- 4:05-4:40 **John Haddox (UTEP)**
Value-Free Science: A Critical Analysis

Cliffhanger Room D

Peter Hutcheson (SWT), Chair

- 3:30-4:05 **Robert Skipper (SWT)**

4:05-4:40 Can Artifacts Have Interests?
Robert Ferrell (UTEP)
The Philosophy Of Food

Cliffhanger Room C
Gary Cesarz, Presiding
4:45-5:15 **Presidential Address**
Vincent Luizzi (SWT)
Human Nature, Spring, And The New Mexico West
Texas Philosophical Society

Vincent Luizzi, Presiding
5:45-6:45 **Annual Business Meeting**

SUNDAY, APRIL 17
Fifth Session
8:30-11:10 a.m.

Cliffhanger Room C
Gary Cesarz (UNM), Chair
8:30-9:05 **Jeff Dycus (Morehead State U)**
Nozick's View Of Reductionism
9:05-9:40 **Dane Depp (Las Vegas, NM)**
The Inseparability Of The Rortean Self And Public
Interest

10:00-10:35 **Ric Northrup (Morehead State U)**
Autonomy And Otherness In The Social Psychology
Of Mead
10:35-11:10 **Arthur Stewart (Lamar U)**
Peirce, Logic, And A Strategy Of Liberal Education